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RESUMO: uma visão da tensão entre poder e o
magma do imaginário social (Castoriadis)
que admite a porosidade da esfera públi-
ca como reino ambivalente: alvo de colo-
nização por parte do poder, e, também,
espaço no qual os atores sociais buscam
influenciar o sistema,que se desloca cada
vez mais do mundo vivo.
Neste ensaio procuro proble-
matlzar o conceito da esfera pública como
elaborado por Jürgen Habermas.Faço uma
crítica orgânica â concepção Imaculada
desta como tambémdos conceitoschaves
do agir comunicativo e do mundo vivo. Ao
mesmo tempo, quero evitar uma queda
tanto em posições foucaultianas, que
absolutisam a tal ponto os procedimentos
de exclusão que a idéia de um agir inte-
rativo que não se submeteria aos tentácu-
los do poder se encontra anulada, como
também em posições luhmannianas, que
desubstancializam a esfera pública ao
chamá-la uma auto-tematização da socie-
dade. Sem querer idealizar as reservas
inacabadas do projeto da modernidade
(concebido como emancipação do ho-
men através da sua razão - Kant),pleiteio
The intertwining of the “ public sphere”
with modernity, lifeworld and commu-
nicative action
A readingof Habermas which takes
into account both his earliest and his most
recent reflections may reveal a remarkable *g
consistency and continuity. In Structural S
Change of the Public Sphere (1962) he en-
gaged with the historical evolution of the
bourgeois 'public sphere" as a space in
£06
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whichsocial actorscould,through their own
use of reason free of constraint, form opin-
ions and influence power. In Faktizität und
Geltung (1990) Habermas has,in terms of a
theory of legality,embedded the bourgeois
state based on the rule of law (Rechtsstaat)
in a normative framework of legitimacy.
These norms are central to his understand-
ing of the Enlightenment project and the
project of modernity which he,in an explicit
critique of post-structuralism, considers un-
finished (Habermas, 1980).
Like few other contemporary think-
ers, Habermas has invested considerable
tenacity in his critique of the Enlightenment
whilst studiously stearing clear of the Scylla
of a negativistlc instrumental reason
(Horkheimer,Adorno) and the Charybdis of
reductionistic Foucaultian power/knowl-
edge. In both cases he perceives a ten-
dency to narrow the view of Enlightenment
thought to its dark side and complains that
such negativism has obfuscated the coun-
ter-discourse always inherent in the Enlight-
enment. For this reason,as it were, moder-
nity must remain an unfinished project for its
unused reserves reside precisely in its innate
i
ability to overcome itself. Habermas even
goes as far as to read The Dialectic of En-
lightenment as a "performative contradic-
tion" since Adorno and Horkheimer use the
tools of rational critique in order to criticize
reason (Habermas,1985),
Despite the frequent charges that
his theories are idealistic (Axel Honneth),
ahistorical (Albrecht Wellmer) or even
terroristic (Jean-FrançoisLyotard),Habermas
has never been blind to the countervailing
forces in the Enlightenment project and the
modern age it has spawned. In a modifica-
tion of Max Weber's theory of the differen-
tiation of expert cultures in modern capital-
ism (economic, religious,and artistic, for ex-
ample), he views modernity in the cultural
sphere of human intersubjectivity as being
quite distinct from the modernisation proc-
esses of administrative-technological capi-
talism.Technical - administrative modernisa-
tion is articulated by teleological action
(Habermas, 1981), that is, a form of action
constrained by ends (thus rationalisation
shouldbeopposedtorationality).By contrast,
modernity doesnotobeythe same dictates.
As a cultural sphere disengaged from the
nefarious influence of bureaucratic capital-
ism It is uniquely placed to provide a realm
for action based on principles of
intersubjectivity. In this dialectic he locates
his model of society based on the system/
lifeworld distinction. The system (more than
the facticityof institutions) is the realmof tele-
ological (instrumentall) reason moulded by
technical- administrative modernisation.The
lifeworld is a distinct sphere in which, liber-
ated from the autism of system imperatives
(that is, system survival), social actors can
engage with each other in the formation of
norms,values and other social conventions.
Because the system perpetually seeks to
coionize (Habermas) the lifeworld,the"pub-
lic sphere",as a "sphere that mediates be-
tween civil society andthestate in whichthe
public arises as the carrier and transmitter of
public opinion" (Habermas, 1973: 62), be-
comes a realm of mediation and negotia-
tionbetweena system which requiresatleast
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frequently dominated by post-structuralim
and (at times vapid applications of) theo-
ries of the postmodern. His system/lifeworld
distinction could not be further removed
from Foucault's continually influential power
theories. But are their positions necessarily
antinomical or are there opportunities for a
critical synthesis?
The term "exclusion procedures"
derives from Foucault's memorable and
highly performative inaugural lecture in the
College de France in 1970, subsequently
published as L'Ordre du discours. When he
broke with academic protocol and stated
at the outset his desire to be effaced, car-
ried away by discourse,he was being more
than merely ironic. He was alluding to the
institutionalcontrolof discourse (transparent
in such a venerated centre) and also to the
effacement of the subject in the order of
discourse itself. Thus Foucault conceived of
both external and internal exclusion proce-
dures. The external procedures included
prohibition (of putatively deviant sexuality,
for example),division and rejection (the rea-
son versus madness manicheism) and the
true/false opposition. The internal controls
include commentary,the rareflcation of the
author (to which attention will return) and
the impositionof disciplines (which this essay
seeks to resist).With thisaddress Foucault was
elaboratingatheoryof power anddiscourse
which cast off the self-confessed timidity of
his analysis of the mad in La folie à l'âge
classique (1962).
the simulacrum of public opinion for its own
legitimacy and a lifeworld which,in order to
press for change, seeks a place in that
sphere. Action in the lifeworld is not ends-
motivated; rather,it constructs a permanent
quest for social understanding processes
("horizontbildender Kontext und
Verständigungsprozesse" - Habermas, 1984:
590-591). The lifeworld is then the privileged
realm of communicative action.The notion
of communicative action,which Habermas
conceives as being nothing less than a syn-
thesis of Mead's symbolic interactionism,
Wittgenstein's language games, Austin's
speech-act theory and Gadamer's
hermeneutics, always presupposes an
intersubjective action between at least two
social actors.Its normative content islocated
In the affirmation that "actors seek agree-
ment about an action situation in order to
give their action plans and thus also their
actionsbindingforce (Habermas,1981:128)."
Whereas teleological action and dramatur-
gical action (Goffmann) represent no more
than marginal formsof communicationcom-
municative action Is rooted ina rationalcon-
sensuswhichcontinually renewsthe lifeworld.
System, power and procedures of
exclusion
Apart from his reception in the
Anglo-Saxon community andhisremarkable




2 - Luhmann sees the lifeworld as nolhlng more than the basis
and horizon which appear to the observer; these observations
are,by nature, polycontextual - In accordance with systems
theorical premises.
1 - 1 1 should like to acknowledgethe workof Barbara Freitagand
Flâvio Beño Siebeneichler in particular. The absence of a
translation of Theorie des kommunikativen Handeins is to be
lamented.
His theory of anall-pervadingpower
which could not be restricted to repression,
but which created and produced discourse
and knowledge,was refined in Surveiller et
punir (1975)and La volonté de savoir (1976).
It is well known that Foucault considered
Bentham's Panopticonasthe culmination of
power/knowledge- aninstrumentalisationof
reason which sought to replace the ethical
judgement of the infractor with an accumu-
lationof knowledge abouthimandtherefore
maintained him in a state of permament vis-
ibility. Not only was power conflated with
knowledge in a Nietzsche-inspired reaction
to the events of 1968, the pervasiveness of
power in discourse itself was held to be so
microbiotic that the notion of the subject
and the author became meaningless. The
author and,concomitantly,the subject was
to beseen asa mere“ function of discourse"
(Foucault, 1977: 130), that is to say, a con-
vention and function of power "stripped of
its creative role" (Foucault, 1977: 137).
it is instructive that in his most recent
preface to the German edition of Structural
Change of the Public Sphere (1990)
Habermas explicitly uses Foucault's term of
h
"exclusion procedures" when he reviews
critically his rather too immaculate concep-
tion of the bourgeois “ public sphere". The
investment of faith inthe progressive capac-
ity of Kant-inspired rational interaction did
not lead him to overlook the predominance
of men in the café society of eighteenth
century England,but certainly did lead him
to exaggerate the democratic potential of
a "public sphere" which was at that time
leaving the interstices of literary clubs and
occupying a larger political sphere. For
Habermas, the reading public constitutes
itself as a kind of bourgeois“ public sphere".
However,the marginalisation of women into
the salons raises serious doubts about the
credibility of such a postulate.More recently,
theNorth-Americansociologist,David Zaret,
has pointed out that the location of the
genesis of the "public sphere" in enlighten-
ment idealism obscures the public commu-
nication practices of the petitioners in revo-
lutionary England (Zaret, 1996) <3>.
Even if we accept that Habermas
waswriting abouta specific historicalepoch
and that the dearth of analysis about the
exclusion of social actors on grounds of
ethnicity or gender can be better under-
stood today, the inflation and immaculate
view of the “ public sphere" remain at odds
with its veryprecariousness.At the sametime,
Foucault's conflation of power and knowl-
edge and his anathematization of the En-
lightenment flatten this precariousness. As
Peter Dews has pertinently observed,
"Foucault's dogmatic elision of the subject
robs coercion of its object,leaving domina-
tion dematerlalized" (Dews apud During,
1993: 118).
Habermas accuses Foucault of re-
treating“ into the reflectionless objectivity of
a nonparticipatory, ascetic description of
kaleidoscopically changing practices of
power" (Habermas, 1985: 275-276). In es-
sence,Foucault's power theory falls prey to
a relativism in which any counterpower is in-
carcerated within the horizon of the power it94
3- For more on Zaret see Grant (1996 b)
independently of domination by
relations of power" (Horneth. 1985
cited in Rasmussem, 1991: 51).
What conception of the "public
sphere" can be developed which does jus-
tice to thereal tensionsbetweenpower and
social actors, between system and the so-
cial imaginary? What is the nature of the in-
terstices of the"public sphere"which donot
obey exclusion procedures but instead per-
mit the inciusion of competing discourses
which articulate social interactions?
opposes. In terms of a positive critique of
modernity, Habermas argues that this apo-
ria negates the inherent counter-discourse
of the Enlightenment which always provides
the potential for renewal in the communi-
cative action contexts of the lifeworld. The
normative contents of Modernity, such as
legality, validity and legitimacy cannot be
subsumed under power/knowledge. In more
concrete historical terms, the Panopticon
should be understood not as a manipula-
tory instrument,but as a relative progress
rooted in morality and law (although here,
Habermas' contentions surely verge on the
side of a faith gone blind.):
*[Foucault) lets drop the threads of
the legal organization of the exercise
of power and of the legitimation of
the order of domination. Because of
this,the ungrounded impression arises
that the bourgeois constitutional state
is a dysfunctional relic from the period
of absolutism" (Habermas, 1985: 290).
It appears that we are confronted
with two mutually exclusive positions here:
thepower infiltrationof Foucault andthereal
remainder of the normative content of Mo-
dernity in Habermas. But the recognition of
an antinomy is far from being a theoretical
position in itself.Of all the critics of Habermas
and Foucault, Axel Honneth in Kritik der
Macht (1985) indicates a path between
these two extremes by criticizing the dual-
ism of the system/llfeworld distinction which
serves merely to divorce communication
from power:
The “ public spheres” as negotiating
space: the untapped reserves of coun-
ter-discourse as clandestine infiltration
Let us remain within Habermasian
terminology for the meantime, if only to
clarify a dynamic atplay: anidealized"pub-
lic sphere" does injustice to the real tensions
between system and lifeworld. At the same
time, an immaculate conception of the
lifeworld and privileging of communicative
action within this lifeworld fails adequately
to acknowledge the opacity of communi-
cation,its turbulence,its noise factors. Jean-
François Lyotard (whose name is not coinci-
dental at this stage in my argumentation)
argues that Habermas' reduction of com-
municative interaction tothe search for con-
sensus "does violence to language games"
(Lyotard, 1991: XXV). In a selective interpre-
tation of Wittgenstein's concept of lan-
guage games (Wittgenstein, 1988), Lyotard
tendstoregard communication asstrategic:
each languagemove elicitsacountermove
and communication encounters itself in per-
petual motion. Moreover, the dynamics of
IS
es
’ Ultimately,the distinction is based
upon two theoretical fictions,namely,
that an action system can occur
independently of the normative
building of consensus, and that a
communicatively integrated action
sphere, the lifeworld, can occur
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move and countermove inevitably mean
that communication is agonistic, that is to
say,it undergoes transformation as it occurs.
While Lyotard is right in arguing that com-
munication is far less immaculate than the
theory of communicative action suggests,his
enshrinement of strategic games tends to
vitiate the possibility of shared social values
and thus to atomize social communication.
Once again,a recognition of the difference
provides also the first step toward a new
position, formed from a communicative in-
teraction with the ideas in question.
Cornelius Castoriadis' theory of the
social imaginary may provide a solution to
thisproblem(Castoriadis,1989).Society isnot,
as Habermas argues,created by communi-
cative action,for language is always a "fun-
damental institution". Whereas Foucault
grasps power as absolute and Habermas
tends to abstract the llfeworld, Castoriadis
speaks In terms of a relative heteronomy of
social institutions. He distinguishes two types
of "instituting heteronomy": the psychical -
the "social fabrication of the individual"
which makes recognition of the individual
psyche possible only inpathologyand trans-
i
gression (echoes of Foucault here), and the
social - the rites andrituals of the paideia,for
example qua "cognitive providers"
(Castoriadis, 1989: 455). However, such
heteronomies are always relative: there is a
constant tension between what has been
instituted and what is being instituted. The
process of instituting flows from a form of
power (perhaps ‘energy' would be a more
appropriate choice of words) which cannot
be reduced to explicit power (Gewalt or
Macht). This power is the "radicai" or "insti-
tuting ground-power" of the"magma of the
social imaginary". If society is conceived of
in termsof heteronomies alreadygiven,what
place is left for autonomy,for the enlightened
counter-discourse of lifeworid energies?
"Autonomy does not consist in
acting according to a law discovered
in immutable reason and given once
and for all. .. It is the reflexive activity
of a reason creating itself in endless
movement, both as individual and
social reason"(Castoriadis,1989: 473).
Castoriadis' concept of hete-
ronomies which do not crush the radical
ground-power which emanates from the
social imaginary (which is alwaysgenerated
by interaction) mayhelp us toovercomethe
decoupled lifeworid of Habermas'model of
society without denying that the energies of
the formation of the imaginary are not re-
ducible to Foucaultian power/knowledge
complexes. Instituted heteronomy excludes
radical individuation. Here then, the notion
of cognitive autonomy, postulated by the
constructivist Ernst von Giasersfeld,reaches
the full extent of Its reach.
The “ public sphere” as legitimation and
risk for power institutions <4>
Kant realised at an early stage how
the throne becameincreasingly dependent
on the support of the citizens with the ad-
vent of bourgeois society. Public reasoning
wastherefore boththe exercise of the power
of the learned and the strategic willingness96
4 - cf. also Grant (1996)
restricted access and exclusion of control.of the holders of institutionalised power. This
willingness to countenance the exercise of
power from below,as it were,can be attrib-
uted to the new legitimation procedures
that emergedwiththe transition fromcourtly
to bourgeois power. It was no longer pos-
sible toleave thecitizens in obscurantism,The
system of institutionalised power requires the
"public sphere" (or,at least,the simulacrum
thereof) for the purposes of its own
legitimation. At the same time, the citizens
wish to make use of the "public sphere" in
order to pressurize the holders of power. This
becomes all the more evident with the tran-
sition of reasoning anddebate fromthecafé
society into thepoliticalclubs fromwhichthe
first political parties will subsequently spring.
The faith in the legitimacy of a power sys-
tem can only be generated by that illusion
of willingness to negotiate.However,the use
of illusion as an instrument of power comes
at a cost: by creating a plausible illusion of
publicness <5>, the Institutions of power ac-
cept the need to cede some power for the
sake of their own legitimacy. In other words:
the instituionalization of power proceeds
only when the selection procedures of
power are made transparent (Luhmann,
1970). Power requires visibility (Luhmann) or
the "public sphere" in order to generate
legitmacy.
The definiton of classical legal discourse is
however presumed; the central question
about the illusion of a somehow power-free
access is simply not raised. Luhmann thus
makes it easy for himself when he proposes
that we shift from an actor-dependent toan
observer dependent concept of
publicnness (Luhmann, 1995: 184). As a re-
sult,the public sphere is construed asa gen-
eral medium of social seif-refelction which
merely registers the observation of observa-
tions (Luhmann, 1995: 187):
“ The concept of accessibility in-
dicates, either literally or meta-
phorically, space and action. This
limitation can be corrected by
switching from action to observa-
tion. Taking up an idea by Dirk
Baecker one can then define the
public sphere as a reflection of any
internal system frontier, or alterna-
tively: as an internal environment
of social subsystems, that is, of all
interactions and organisations, but
also of all social function systems
as social movements" (Luhmann,
1995: 184-185).
Without abandoning the spatial
conception of a "public sphere" of commu-
nications, the German theorist Robert
Weimann also seeks to eschew the positions
of Habermas and Foucault. In his reflections
on literary discourse and power Weimann
defended the "precarious position of the
subject" against the effacement of the sub-
ject proposed by Foucault. The author sub-
ject cannot be a dimensionless function of
conventions and power, but is an actively
appropriating subject.Naturally enough,the 5
appropriating power of individual social ac-
tors ineluctably enters into conflict with the
Niklas Luhmann has tried to intro-
duce a concept of the "public sphere" dis-
tinct from both public opinion and the sys-
tem of the mass media.To this end,Luhmann
reconstructs the classical legal definiton of




5- The fact that illusions of ahypostatised public sphere aquire a
virtual character will not be lost on the reader.
For a profanization of the “ public
spheres”: conclusion
appropriating power of the system (under-
stood as instituted heteronomies). At the
same time, Weimann rejects Habermas'
equation of reason and communicative ac-
tion,citing the frequency of sex and violence
in mass culture (recent example: Mortal
Kombat: agora a porrada é pra valer!) and
the simulated realities of"real existing social-
ism" (Erich Honecker: there is no acid rain in
socialism!) as indications of the impossibility
of an Immaculate communicative reason
basedof necessity onmutualunderstanding.
It is worth quotingWetmann at length for the
Brazilian reader, in order to do justice to his
acute insights:
On serious grounds,the concept of
a truly "public sphere" can no longer be
taken for granted. Habermas himself con-
cedes that this sphere is not an autarkic
realm,but is subject to exclusionprocedures.
By identifying the"public sphere"closely with
reason and a communicative action lo-
cated In a dislocated lifeworld, Habermas
offers us an all too immaculate conception
of a space which is under threat. As a ne-
gotiating space, the "public sphere" oper-
ates with procedures of exclusion,but does
not entirely foreclose all communicative
space. However precarious the position of
the communicating socialactor maybe,the
"radical ground-power" of the social imagi-
nary has succeeded in forcing upon hege-
monic power new reflections which
artlcualte agendas long denied access to
the "public sphere".This is true of ethnic and
non-ethnic minority rights, of the ecology
movement in Northern Europe,of feminism.
In other words,the"public sphere",riven with
power struggles and peppered with dark
spots,still enables social actors to pressurize
the system and resist its constraints. By the
same token,because the "public sphere" is
an intermediate instance between system
and lifeworld/ groundforce of the social
imaginary, it is far from immaculate. To act
in the "public sphere" is to negotiate,medi-
ate and deal (a form of strategic language
game,but not in the absolute sense in which
Lyotard uses the term) with power. This ne-
gotiation tends,in turn,to domesticate new
"It is of course a justified obser-
vation that the ‘project of moder-
nity ' still conceals within itself
certain unexhausted potentials
and reserves . Nevertheless the
contemporary western world, and
also the 'Third World' and what at
the time termed itself the socialist
world cannot be adequately com-
prehended, in all their cultural
complexity and discursive activi-
ties,as long as the concept of rea-
son, albeit reformed to encompass
the concept of communication,
remains the point of departure
Insofar as this is the case, I be-
lieved, and still do believe, that
Habermas' concepts of reason and
communication are still rooted in a
grand hope for advancement, be-
ginning with the Enlightenment and
reaching beyond it into the
present. It is a very beautiful and
very admirable hope which, how-
ever, unfortunately fails to take
account of the actual embroilment
of linguistic activities in a system of
declared or concealed constraints
and preconditions of communica-
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